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MIS (UNDERSTANDING)JUDGING
The Honorable Philip M. Pro*
In his article, Misjudging,1 Professor Guthrie argues that because judges
possess "blinders" that make adjudication on the merits difficult, alternative
dispute resolution processes may better serve the interests of potential liti-
gants.2 Acknowledging that serving over a quarter century on the federal
bench undoubtedly influences my views on the subject, I offer my response
with the hope that readers will not dismiss them as a predictable or "blind"
defense of judges and the process of adjudication in our courts. Perhaps it is
really just a matter of perspective.
That one's perspective can enhance or obscure understanding is illustrated
by a story I heard many years ago about Abraham Lincoln's representation of
railroad interests in Illinois in the 1850s.3 Although it may be apocryphal, the
story relates to Lincoln's defense of the Illinois Central Railroad in a case
brought by a plaintiff for damages to goods allegedly suffered during shipment
by Lincoln's client. Lincoln barely examined a witness and made no objections
throughout the trial. Following plaintiffs exhaustive summation, Lincoln
stood before the jury and stated, "Gentlemen, you have heard the evidence.
Plaintiffs counsel has stated the facts exactly right, but his conclusions are all
wrong." After a brief summation by Lincoln, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the railroad. Plaintiffs counsel was flabbergasted and asked Lincoln,
"Abe, how on earth did you pull that one off?" Lincoln provided the following
possible explanation:
Well, counsel, today at lunch I walked over to the tavern near the courthouse where I
happened to see the members of the jury also taking their lunch. Mindful of my
ethical obligation to avoid inappropriate communications with members of the jury, I
decided to eat my lunch standing at the bar. During lunch, in a voice perhaps loud
enough for some of the jurors to hear, I told the bartender a story I heard recently
about a farmer near Springfield who was plowing his field when his five-year-old son
came running up to him yelling, "Pa, Pa, come quick! Big sister is up in the hayloft
with the hired hand. And Pa, big sister has her dress pulled up over her shoulders
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and the hired hand has his overalls dropped down around his ankles. Pa, I think they
are going to pee on the hay!" As the farmer unstrapped the plow, picked up his
nearby shotgun, and headed for the barn, he turned to his boy and said, "Son, you've
got your facts exactly right, but your conclusions are all wrong."
I offer this story not because I think Professor Guthrie has his facts
"exactly right" or his conclusions "all wrong," or because my response is unas-
sailable. I suggest, however, there is considerable room for disagreement with
Professor Guthrie's apparent perspective on judges and the adjudication of
cases in our courts.
Resolving disputes is often difficult, whatever the forum, and the results
are frequently imperfect. Our state and federal courts traditionally have pro-
vided the predominant forum for dispute resolution. Indeed, they still do. Nev-
ertheless, I concur with Professor Guthrie that disputants and lawyers should
not assume the courthouse is the best place to resolve their disputes in every
case. The proliferation of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") processes in
recent years has offered a variety of useful options that parties to a dispute can
and should consider in selecting the optimum forum in which to seek resolu-
tion. They should do so, however, with a clear understanding of the strengths
and weaknesses of the alternatives they are considering.
Naturally, judges, like anyone else, may be limited when making decisions
by the informational, cognitive, and attitudinal "blinders" described by Profes-
sor Guthrie. So, too, are the mediators, arbitrators, neutrals, and others
involved in various ADR processes, including the parties to the dispute and
their counsel. Potential litigants surely should consider this human element that
affects everyone involved in the resolution of any dispute. They also should
consider the structure and rules of the various dispute resolution mechanisms in
assessing which process will work best for resolving their particular dispute.
Judges are not characteristically hostile to ADR. In my experience, most
embrace ADR as a valuable tool to help resolve matters quickly and inexpen-
sively, leaving room on the court docket for cases that may not lend themselves
to an ADR option. Moreover, although I have not researched the panoply of
court-annexed ADR programs available throughout state and local court sys-
tems, ADR is clearly a viable component of our nation's federal courts.
For example, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 requires
United States District Courts to provide ADR services to civil litigants.4 A
wide variety of ADR programs have developed within the ninety-four United
States District Courts including settlement conferences, arbitration, mediation
programs, early neutral evaluations, and summary jury trials, among others. A
preliminary study of forty-nine United States District Courts conducted in 2005
by the Federal Judicial Center found that out of a total 24,835 cases that went
through court-annexed ADR programs, 15,555 of those cases were referred to
some form of mediation.5 In May 2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ADR Committee, under the auspices of the Western Justice Center Foundation,
4 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (Oct. 30,
1998).
5 In Resolving Disputes, Mediation Most Favored Option in District Courts, 38 THE THIRD




published Education Programs on Court-Sponsored ADR: Model Programs
and Guide to Resources, which offers guidance to federal courts and members
of the bar on how to implement court-annexed ADR programs.6
Hence, any potential litigants and their counsel should recognize that in
selecting a court as a forum to commence resolution of their dispute, they are,
in the federal courts as well as in most state courts, entering a process that itself
provides effective ADR options. I do not suggest for a moment that potential
litigants should limit themselves to the courts. Like most busy judges, I would
encourage all potential litigants to consider resolution of their disputes prior to
initiating lawsuits. I also would encourage them, however, to keep matters in
perspective when making a forum selection.
In choosing a forum, disputants and their counsel should consider that
unlike most ADR options, the process of judicial decision-making in our state
and federal courts involves elements that more fully account for and safeguard
against the types of inimical blinding influences cited by Professor Guthrie.
Ultimately, Professor Guthrie acknowledges that the same blinders afflicting
judges potentially afflict everyone involved in a dispute, including those per-
forming in the ADR context. But his analysis does not fully consider whether
the procedural and other safeguards that operate throughout the court process
are similarly in play in the context of ADR, and the impact of those safeguards
on forum selection.
For example, Professor Guthrie warns of people's tendency "to overesti-
mate the predictability of past events due to 'hindsight bias'... ."' Professor
Guthrie asserts that "hindsight bias can influence determinations of legal liabil-
ity, where judges or juries are called upon to assess the reasonableness of some
conduct after the event has occurred." 8 How could it be otherwise? The very
function of a fact-finder is to reach the appropriate resolution of a dispute based
upon evidence of past events. The potential for hindsight bias is inherent in
dispute resolution through any process. A judge, jury, mediator, neutral, or
arbitrator is faced with a similar dilemma in attempting to facilitate reasonable
resolution, assign fault, or judge liability, whether guiding the parties to settle-
ment or imposing judgment.
Where they have a choice, parties and their counsel understandably will be
guided by their subjective assessment of which forum best serves their per-
ceived interests. In doing so, it is important that they consider the self-aware-
ness and training of judges regarding the "blinders" that otherwise may
interfere with the accurate application of governing law to the facts of the case.
More importantly, they should consider the structural and procedural safe-
guards within the court process that are designed to attenuate the danger of
"misjudging."
Beyond the reasonable assumption that nearly all judges conscientiously
want to avoid misjudging, there are other factors to consider. Among those
factors are the bifurcation of law and fact-finding allocated to the judge and
6 DANA L. CURTIS, THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADR COMM., EDUCATION PROGRAMS ON COURT-
SPONSORED ADR: MODEL PROGRAMS AND GUIDE TO RESOURCES (2006), available at http://
www2.ce9.uscourts.gov/committees/adr/program-guide.html.




jury, various rules of civil procedure and evidence, the Canons of Judicial Con-
duct and financial disclosure requirements applicable to judges, the public
nature of court proceedings and transparency of judicial decision-making, the
availability of appellate review, and the fundamental elements of the adver-
sarial process itself, which all work to reduce the danger of misjudging.
A judge's self awareness of the dynamics of decision-making should not
be underestimated. Most judges I have encountered over many years appreci-
ate that the decisions they make are only as sound as the information upon
which those decisions are based. Of course, this is true of anyone, including a
juror, an arbitrator, a mediator, a neutral evaluator, a party to a dispute, or legal
counsel. Issues human, economic, and constitutional surge up against the walls
of our courtrooms every day, and one has only to engage in the humbling chal-
lenge of judicial decision-making to appreciate how fallible we all can be.
Inevitably, the experience of judging builds insight in each judge regarding the
importance and challenge of accurately applying the governing law to the facts
of the case, as well as the consequences of failing to do so. It is the very need
for complete and accurate information to resolve disputes fairly that drives the
pleading and discovery process and the entire adversarial system that plays out
in our courts every day.
Moreover, the importance of correctly determining the governing law of
the case and the danger of allowing inadmissible evidence or inappropriate
influences to creep into the process are precisely why the functions of the
judge, as the arbiter of the law of the case, and the jury as the finder of fact and
credibility, generally are divided. The failure to account fully for this bifur-
cated process, which dominates our federal and state court systems, undermines
Professor Guthrie's conclusions about the potential impact of "misjudging"
based on the experiments conducted with various cadres of judges regarding
subsequent remedial measures, attorney-client privilege, and the impact of prior
criminal convictions.9
For example, the experiment regarding subsequent remedial measures at
the 1992 Ohio Judicial Conference described by Professor Guthrie ignores an
important judicial reality. While a judge surely will be cognizant of the evi-
dence that judge has ruled inadmissible, the jury as finder of fact is not, and
thus should not be influenced inappropriately. Similarly, the Wistrich, Guthrie
and Rachlinski study1" fails to account for another separation of functions
within the judicial system that generally operates to militate against attitudinal
blinders. As the study suggests, a judge's assessment of an appropriate dam-
ages award indeed may be influenced, or anchored, by knowledge of a demand
made at a pre-trial hearing or settlement conference. However, in practice, the
judge who conducts a settlement conference rarely is the same judge who con-
ducts the trial, at least where the trial is going to proceed before the court sitting
without a jury. Another study" Professor Guthrie cites to illustrate the impact
of anchoring on judges is framed as a personal injury lawsuit in federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction. The study rests on the unlikely assumption that
9 Id. at 422-23.
10 Id. at 432 n.60.
I I Id. at 432 n.66.
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both parties to a personal injury case would waive a jury, which in my experi-
ence is about as common as big sister and the hired hand peeing on the hay.
The impact of procedural and evidentiary rules is particularly important in
understanding how litigation progresses and judicial decisions are made. In
making case-dispositive or other decisions regarding claims, defenses, or the
admissibility of evidence, judges are bound by well-recognized legal standards.
The relevant jurisdiction's Rules of Evidence guide the admissibility of evi-
dence, including evidence that otherwise would unfairly prejudice a litigant
before the fact-finder. The procedural safeguards applicable under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are fairly typical of those in most state courts as well.
These rules are extremely important to the adjudication process in our courts
and have a real "anti-blinding" impact.
For example, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a federal district court may
consider only "all well-pleaded allegations of material fact" and must construe
those allegations "in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. '" 1 2 A
court may not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim unless it
appears, on the face of the complaint, that the plaintiff could prove no set of
facts that would support his or her claim. 13 Moreover, a district court must
treat a motion to dismiss "as a motion for summary judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 if either party to the motion to dismiss submits
materials outside the pleadings in support or opposition to the motion, and if
the district court relies on those materials."1 4
Similarly, a district court may grant a summary judgment motion only if
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any" demonstrate "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."' 5 The court must view all justifiable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. 16 Furthermore, "[a] trial court can only
consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment."' 7
These rules and countless others serve to bring coherence and consistency
to the resolution of disputes in our courts. While some might argue that parties
give up control of their dispute by subjecting themselves to the court process
and its rules, I suggest an equally valid perspective is that the rules enable the
parties, their counsel, and the court to control the resolution of the dispute in a
fair manner.
Another fundamentally important force counteracting the impact of
"blinders" on judicial decision-making that Professor Guthrie fails to address is
the public nature of the court process. With certain exceptions,' 8 all state and
12 Wyler Summit P'ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted).
13 See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hicks v. Small, 69 F.3d 967, 969
(9th Cir. 1995).
14 Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
16 County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).
17 Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
56(e)); see also Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988).
18 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (grand jury proceedings); Matter of Sealed Affidavit(s) to
Search Warrants Executed on February 14, 1979, 600 F.2d 1256, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1979)
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federal court filings, hearings, and judicial decisions are open to public scru-
tiny. So, too, are jury verdicts and the entire appeals process. Moreover, the
advent of electronic filing and case management systems ("CM/ECF")1 9 and
public access through systems such as Public Access to Court Electronic
Records ("PACER")2" that are prevalent in the United States courts, makes it
possible for those wishing to study judicial decision-making to do so compre-
hensively rather than to rely on the small percentage of judicial opinions pub-
lished in the Federal Supplement, or similar services. Thus, virtually all
decisions in every federal case are now available to any researcher who wishes
to plow that field.
I am aware of no similar means of examining what actually occurs in most
ADR settings. I am not suggesting that the circumstances should be otherwise,
but the difference makes comparisons of the competing processes more diffi-
cult and conclusions about their comparative value necessarily subjective.
The goals of parties opting for some form of ADR as compared to tradi-
tional court litigation are often quite different. Most forms of ADR understand-
ably are designed to facilitate the resolution of disputes in a more informal,
flexible, less costly, often non-binding, and confidential forum in which a
mediator, neutral, or arbitrator can help bring parties to an acceptable
resolution.
By comparison, court proceedings and judges' decisions should, with rare
exception, be public and those involved in the process should be accountable.
Indeed, the decisional independence so important to the rule of law in this
country and public confidence in our justice system require such transparency.
Additionally, the Codes of Judicial Conduct that apply to most judges, the vari-
ous public financial disclosures judges must file, and the very active and public
appeals process also help to ward off the "blinding" impact of inappropriate
influences.
The transparency of court proceedings perhaps makes the courts the most
suitable forum for what Professor Guthrie characterizes without definition as
"politically salient" issues.2 Venturing a contextual guess as to what Professor
Guthrie means by "politically salient," it is undeniable that many cases are
litigated in our state and federal courts that involve constitutional, economic,
and social issues of local, state, national, or even international importance.
Clearly the resolution of such issues may have a profound and precedential
impact beyond the individual interests of the disputants before the court. In a
political and economic sense, such cases may affect the allocation of values or
goods and services as well as the relationships between public and private
rights and interests now and in the future. However, even if one accepts Pro-
(holding courts have inherent power to control papers filed with the court, including sealing
documents, within constitutional and other limitations); NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 21(5)(d)
(directing the legislature to make rules for the confidentiality of judicial disciplinary pro-
ceedings); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62H. 100-. 170 (West 2006) (providing for sealing juve-
nile justice records).
19 See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, CM/ECF Frequently Asked Questions (2006),
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/cmecf/ecffaq.html#GE 1.
20 See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Public Access to Court Electronic Records Over-
view, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
21 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 446.
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fessor Guthrie's extensive discussion of politically-grounded attitudinal blind-
ers,2" he fails to explain why disputants to politically salient issues may find the
ADR process more suitable than the transparent and more fully accountable
process available through our courts.2 3 It may be a matter of perspective, but in
my view, with rare exception, the private resolution of politically salient issues
through ADR processes, when and if that is possible, may diminish the public
debate and deprive political decision-makers, such as voters or legislators, of
information they need to evaluate and resolve the issues on a larger scale.
Do the structural safeguards and procedures discussed in this response
guarantee that what Professor Guthrie characterizes as "misjudging" will never
occur? Of course not. Are some disputes more amenable to resolution in a
forum other than the adversarial one provided by the trial courts? Of course
they are. While I agree with Professor Guthrie's analysis of the benefits of
various forms of ADR, I suggest he has not fully considered some of the princi-
pal safeguards that serve to attenuate the danger of misjudging in the court
process. The presence of those safeguards, and perhaps the absence of similar
ameliorating factors in the ADR context, should be carefully balanced by those
selecting a dispute resolution forum. In the end, forum selection will remain a
subjective decision by the parties to a dispute - a matter of perspective.
22 Id. at 440-46.
23 It is difficult to conceive how cases such as Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), would be
better suited to mediation or arbitration. I seriously doubt the parties to such politically
salient cases as Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405
(2006) (holding that an employer may be liable for retaliatory discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for materially adverse actions that would discourage a rea-
sonable employee from making a discrimination claim); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (holding that a university forfeits all fed-
eral funding where it denies military recruiters the same access to students it provides to
other employers); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320
(2006) (striking down New Hampshire's law regulating abortions for minors); or Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (removing a bar under the Controlled Substances Act prohibit-
ing doctors from prescribing certain drugs for physician-assisted suicide under Oregon law),
would be better suited to ADR than the court process.
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